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ARGUMENT 
POINT I . THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE VICTIM 
SUSTAINED "SERIOUS BODILY INJURY." 
(Replying to State's brief at Point I, pp. 15-21) 
A. OVERVIEW OF RECENT CHANGES TO UTAH'S 
STATUTORY SCHEME. 
Effective May 1, 1995, the legislature revamped Utah's 
statutory scheme for assault and aggravated assault. Prior to that 
time, Utah recognized only two classes of injury: "bodily injury" 
and "serious bodily injury." Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3) 
(1995), "bodily injury" was defined as "physical pain, illness, or 
any impairment of physical condition." Utah Code Ann. §76-1-
601(10) (1995) defined "serious bodily injury'7 as "bodily injury 
that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted 
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, 
or creates a substantial risk of death." 
Under the former version of the code, an assault which 
resulted in only "bodily injury" was a class B misdemeanor under 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102 (1995) . An assault which resulted in 
"serious bodily injury" was a third degree felony aggravated 
assault under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1995). 
The 1995 amendments added a third, intermediate level of 
bodily injury, termed "substantial bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. 
§76-1-601(11) (Supp. 1998). The language used to describe both 
"bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury" remained unchanged. 
"Substantial bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury, not 
amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or causes 
protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary 
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(11) (Supp. 1998). 
Under these amendments, assault which results in only 
"bodily injury" remains a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-102(2) (Supp. 1998). Assault which results in "substantial 
bodily injury" is a class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
102(3) (Supp. 1998). Aggravated assault which results in "serious 
bodily injury" is a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103(1) (a), -(2) (Supp. 1998). Aggravated assault which fails to 
cause serious bodily injury, but nevertheless involves use of a 
2 
weapon or "other means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury," is a third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103(l)(b), -(3) (Supp. 1998). 
B. CASES RELIED ON BY THE STATE FAIL TO 
RECOGNIZE OR CONSIDER UTAH'S CURRENT 
THREE TIER SYSTEM FOR CATEGORIZING BODILY 
INJURY. 
1. Gardner, involving the assault by 
prisoner statute, involves a two 
tier system of categorizing bodily 
injury. 
First, the State cites a single Utah case, State v. 
Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 651 (Utah 1997), for the proposition that 
w
 [a] broken arm, foot, or even finger would satisfy the [aggravated 
assault by prisoner] statute's definition of serious bodily injury 
as 'protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member.'" First, it should be made clear that the court's 
statement in Gardner was mere dicta. The actual injury allegedly 
inflicted by Gardner was much more than a mere "broken arm, foot, 
or even finger." Gardner "allegedly stabbed a fellow inmate 
multiple times in the face, neck, abdomen, and chest, causing 
serious bodily injury." Gardner, 947 P.2d at 631. 
More importantly, Gardner was charged under the 1995 
version of the code for a violation of aggravated assault by a 
prisoner. See Gardner, 947 P. 2d at 631-32. Unlike Utah's assault 
and aggravated assault statutes, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, 
103 (Supp. 1998), the aggravated assault by prisoner statute 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5 (Supp. 1998) draws no 
distinction between serious bodily injury and substantial bodily 
3 
injury. The Supreme Court in Gardner had no occasion to determine 
whether a "broken arm, foot, or even finger" would constitute 
substantial bodily injury rather than serious bodily injury, as the 
aggravated assault by a prisoner statute draws no such 
distinctions. Gardner is unhelpful in addressing the issue now 
before this court. While under a two tier system a mere "broken 
arm, foot or even finger" may have qualified as "serious bodily 
injury," under the present three tier system at issue here such an 
injury which heals in its natural course should be considered only 
"substantial bodily injury." 
2. Cases from other jurisdictions cited 
by the State, with a single 
exception, involve two tier systems 
of injury classification. 
The State's reliance on cases from other jurisdictions is 
similarly flawed, as none of those jurisdictions except Minnesota 
have a three tier system of addressing bodily injury. The 
Minnesota statutory scheme is addressed at Point I.A.3., infra at 
6. 
Walker v. State, 742 P.2d 790 (Alaska App. 1987) . Alaska 
uses a two tier system comparable to that used by Utah prior to 
1995. An assault in Alaska may be "assault in the first degree" if 
a person causes "serious physical injury" to another. Alaska Stat. 
§11.41.200 (1998). "Serious physical injury" includes a physical 
injury that causes "protracted loss or impairment of the function 
of a body member or organ. . . ." Alaska Stat. 
§11. 81. 900 (b) (53) (B) (1998) . An assault in Alaska may be "assault 
in the second degree" if the person only causes "physical injury" 
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to another. Alaska Stat. §11.41.210. However, Alaska has no 
intermediate definition of injury that would include temporary loss 
or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. 
State v. Weiton. 300 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Iowa 1981) . Iowa 
has only two tiers of physical injury. Iowa Code Ann. § 708.2 
(Supp. 1999) (delineating separate penalties for assault with 
intent to inflict serious injury versus and assault that causes 
bodily injury). Iowa's definition of "serious injury" is 
essentially identical to that used by Utah and other states in 
defining "serious physical injury" or "serious bodily injury," and 
includes "protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ." Iowa Code Ann. § 702.18 (quoted in 
Welton. 300 N.W.2d at 159). Again, there is no intermediate level 
of injury to cover temporary loss or impairment. 
State v. Mentola, 691 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. App. 1985); State 
v. Pettit. 976 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. App. 1998). Missouri only 
distinguishes between two levels of injury, and uses definitions 
that are essentially identical in pertinent part to Utah's 
definitions of "serious bodily injury" and "bodily injury," but 
without an intermediate level. See Mo. Ann. Stat. §565.002 and 
§565.050 et seq. (Vernon Supp. 1999). 
People v. Fosselman, 659 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Cal. 1983). 
California does not have any intermediate level of bodily injury. 
With reference to battery, the injury is either "serious bodily 
injury" or "injury." Cal. Penal Code §243(f) (4), -(5) (West 1999). 
"Serious bodily injury" does include "protracted loss or impairment 
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of function of any bodily member or organ. . . ,n id. , but there is 
no intermediate level of injury to account for temporary loss or 
impairment. See id. 
State v. Diaz, 612 So.2d 1019 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1993) . 
Louisiana has a two tier system. Second degree battery requires 
"serious bodily injury." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:34.1 (1997). No 
intermediate degree of bodily injury exists. 
Commonwealth v. Nichols, 692 A.2d 181 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1979); Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 A.2d 1087 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). 
Pennsylvania has a two tier system. "Bodily injury" and "serious 
bodily injury" are defined in 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2301 (1998) . No 
intermediate degree of bodily injury exists. 
Each of the above cases is inapposite here, as none 
address a three tier classification system such as Utah's scheme. 
3. Under Minnesota's three tier 
statutory scheme, a broken bone that 
heals in the normal course would 
only be substantial bodily injury. 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.02(7a) defines substantial bodily 
harm as follows: 
Subd. 7a. Substantial Bodily Harm. 
"Substantial bodily harm" means bodily injury which 
involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or 
which causes a temporary but substantial loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, 
or which causes a fracture of any bodily member. 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.02(8) defines great bodily harm as follows: 
Subd. 8. Great Bodily Harm. "Great bodily 
harm" means bodily injury which creates a high 
probability of death, or which causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted 
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member 
or organ or other serious bodily harm. 
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Minnesota's statutory scheme expressly makes a fractured 
bone only substantial bodily harm. The same result should pertain 
here. "Substantial bodily injury" in Utah is defined as "bodily 
injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or 
causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or 
temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member 
or organ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) (Supp. 1998). The 
gravity of harm associated with a broken bone is squarely 
comparable to protracted physical pain or temporary disfigurement, 
the other conditions which constitute substantial bodily injury. 
At the time of trial, Mr. Brem's jaw was completely healed, except 
that holding a flashlight in his mouth causes him pain. Notably, 
to the extent this pain is considered protracted physical pain, it 
likewise places this injury in the "substantial bodily injury" 
category. In sum, any broken bone which is not life threatening 
and heals normally in the usual time frame should be considered a 
temporary loss or impairment of function, making the injury 
"substantial bodily injury." Because Mr. Brem's injury was not 
"serious bodily injury," the trial court erred in allowing the 
second degree felony aggravated assault charge to go to the jury. 
State v. Bridcreforth, 357 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. App. 1984), 
cited by the State at 19 n.6, 20, holds that the permanent loss of 
a tooth constitutes great bodily injury. The case does not address 
a temporary loss of function, which would constitute substantial 
bodily injury under Minnesota's statutory scheme. 
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C. THE STATE'S PROPOSED STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
RENDERS THE DEFINITION OF "SUBSTANTIAL BODILY 
INJURY" SUPERFLUOUS AND MEANINGLESS, IN 
CONTRAVENTION OF SETTLED PRINCIPLES OF 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
The State suggests that this Court should not look beyond 
the plain language of the definition of "serious bodily injury." 
In essence, the State seeks to ignore the statutory changes enacted 
by the legislature, and return to the two tier system employed up 
until that time. This Court is not at liberty to bury its head in 
the sand and ignore a valid enactment of the legislature. 
It is important to give effect to all provisions of a 
statute. This Court has noted: 
Additionally, we adhere to the principle that 
[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts 
or sections and is animated by one general purpose 
and intent. Consequently, each part or section 
should be construed in connection with every other 
part or section so as to produce a harmonious 
whole. Thus, it is not proper to confine 
interpretation to the one section to be 
construed.... [W]hen interpreting a statute all 
parts must be construed together without according 
undue importance to a single or isolated portion. 
State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 234-5 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting 2A 
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05, at 103 
(5th ed.1992) (footnotes omitted)). The State's construction 
renders all provisions addressing substantial bodily injury mere 
surplusage. 
Properly construed, using all appropriate tools of 
statutory construction, a fractured bone that heals in the normal 
course constitutes only substantial bodily injury, rather than 
serious bodily injury. This court should enter conviction for 
8 
class A misdemeanor assault causing substantial bodily injury in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1)0) (Supp. 1998). See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1995) (allowing appellate court to 
enter judgment for included offense if requested by defendant). 
Alternatively, this court may reverse and remand for trial on 
whether the State can meet the elements of third degree felony 
aggravated assault under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1) (b) (Supp. 
1998) . 
POINT II. ERRORS IN JURY VOIR DIRE DEPRIVED MR. 
LELEAE OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
(Replying to State's brief at Point II, pp. 21-27) 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO ASK QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED BY 
THE DEFENSE. 
The State argues that the authority cited by the 
defendant to support the correctness of his proposed voir dire 
question 41 actually "tends to reject, rather than support, the 
propriety of this question." (State's Br. at 24) (citing Allen v. 
United States, 164 U.S. 492, 499-502, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 
(1896)). The State argues that Allen stands for the proposition 
that members of a jury should "keep an open mind in the face of 
[an] opposing majority viewpoint." (State's Br. at 24.) This is 
indeed part of what Allen stands for; but this does not undermine 
the defendant's argument that question 41 was proper. The jury in 
Allen was properly instructed that "the verdict must be the verdict 
of each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the 
conclusion of his fellows." Allen, 164 U.S. at 501. 
9 
Question 41 asked whether a juror would uchange your 
verdict only because you were in the minority?" (R. 378:74; 139-
146) . That question is proper under Allen, was not covered by 
other voir dire, and should have been asked by the trial court. An 
affirmative answer that a juror would surrender deeply held 
convictions merely because they were in the minority would support 
a challenge for cause. An equivocal response could lead the 
defense to exercise peremptory challenges differently. 
Similarly, question 26 addressing whether the jurors 
would evaluate the testimony of the defendant the same as other 
witnesses was proper and should have been asked by the trial court. 
Some persons have a tendency to discount or reject the testimony of 
a criminal defendant merely because they have been charged. Other 
questioning by the trial court failed to address whether the jury 
would fairly assess the testimony of Mr. Leleae. This question 
should have been asked. 
Finally, question 49 concerning eyewitness identification 
should have been asked. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly 
noted the problems inherent in eyewitness identification. E.g. 
State v. Loner, 721 P.2d 483, 488-92 (Utah 1986); State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 1991) . In Long, the Supreme Court 
recognized that despite "the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness 
identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these 
problems. People simply do not understand the deleterious effects 
that certain variables can have on the accuracy of the memory 
processes of an honest eyewitness." Long, 721 P. 2d at 490 
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(citations omitted). In fact, common knowledge held by jurors 
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications "often runs 
contrary to documented research findings"; jurors generally give 
tremendous weight to eyewitness identification testimony even where 
the credibility of the witness is "thoroughly discredited by 
counsel." Jd. In light of these serious concerns, a perfunctory 
"will you follow the law as stated by the judge?" is insufficient 
to adequately probe for opinions and biases on the part of jurors 
that are contrary to the law.1 Question 4 9 should have been asked. 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to ask these 
three questions. 
B. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO GRANT A 
FOR-CAUSE CHALLENGE AGAINST PROSPECTIVE 
JUROR STEVEN WRIGHT. 
A juror's relationship with the prosecutor or with police 
officer witnesses raises the question of that juror's ability to be 
impartial. State v. Coxf 826 P.2d 656, 660 (UtahApp. 1992). When 
such a question is raised, the trial court has a duty to either 
dismiss the potential juror or to question that person further as 
to her ability to be impartial. Cox, 826 P.2d at 660. 
"The depth of investigation required varies in each 
situation and xis necessarily dependent on the juror's responses to 
the questions asked. Nevertheless, the exploration should not be 
merely pro forma.'" Cox, 826 P. 2d at 660 (quoting Woolley, 810 P. 2d 
xTaken literally, the State's position would reduce voir dire 
to that single question. An affirmative response that jurors will 
follow the law renders all other questions cumulative, and the 
failure to ask additional questions harmless. Obviously, this is 
not the law. 
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at 445). "An inference of bias 'is generally not rebutted simply 
by a subsequent general statement by the juror that he or she can 
be fair and impartial.'" Cox, 826 P. 2d at 660 (quoting Woolley, 810 
P. 2d at 445) . "The court, not the juror, must determine a juror's 
qualifications." Cox, 826 P. 2d at 660 (quoting State v. Jones, 734 
P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987), aff 'd, 808 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1991)). 
Here, the trial court's questioning was pro forma and failed to 
dispel the inference of bias raised by the jurors opinion that, in 
essence, Detective Nudd is hard but fair, and does things that are 
in a person's best interest. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE 
COMPLETENESS DOCTRINE CLAIM. 
Replying to State's brief at Point III, pp. 28-35) 
The State criticizes defendant for citing only one case 
that has held that the doctrine of completeness continues to apply 
to oral statements. (State's Br. at 30, citing United States v. 
Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993).) The State cites a 
number of cases that have held that Rule 106 "is not applicable on 
its plain language to oral statements," State's Br. at 30-31, yet 
wholly fails to cite any case that has held that the general 
doctrine of completeness does not apply to oral statements. 
Application of the doctrine of completeness to oral 
conversations is long-established in the common law. Rule 106 is 
only a partial codification of the common law doctrine of 
completeness. The doctrine of completeness has been further 
codified in Rule 611(a) which does allow the application of the 
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doctrine of completeness to oral statements. Haddad, 10 F.3d at 
1258. 
The Seventh Circuit in Haddad is not alone in applying 
the doctrine of completeness to oral statements. The Tenth 
Circuit, in an unreported opinion, has stated, "While Rule 106 
explicitly applies only to writings and recorded statements, the 
rule of completeness embodied in Rule 106 is substantially 
applicable to oral testimony as well by virtue of Fed. R. Evid. 
611(a), which obligates the court to make the interrogation and 
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth." United 
States v. Zamudio, No. 96-2182 (10th Cir. Apr. 6, 1998) (internal 
quotations omitted) (copy attached as addendum B) . The Second 
Circuit has held that the doctrine of completeness "is stated as to 
writings in Fed. R. Evid. 106, but Fed R. Evid. 611(a) renders it 
substantially applicable to oral testimony as well." United States 
v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 650 n.5 (2d Cir. 1989). 
Other circuits have also indicated continuing approval 
for the application of the doctrine of completeness to oral 
statements through Rule 611 (a) . See United States v. Branch, 91 
F.3d 699, 727-728 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Collicott, 92 
F.3d 973, 984 n. 12 (9th Cir. 1996). 
The court in the present case allowed the prosecution to 
present a portion of the defendant's statement out of context. 
Taken out of context, the meaning of the defendant's statement was 
distorted. The legal principle is simple: 
[W]hether we operate under Rule 106's 
embodiment of the rule of completeness, or 
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under the more general provision of Rule 
611(a), we remain guided by the overarching 
principle that it is the trial court's 
responsibility to exercise common sense and a 
sense of fairness to protect the rights of the 
parties while remaining ever mindful of the 
court's obligation to protect the interest of 
society in the 'ascertainment of truth.' 
United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576 (2nd Cir. 1987) . 
The State argues that the doctrine of completeness does 
"not serve to admit inadmissible hearsay." State's Br. at 31. The 
State confuses the issue of unrelated hearsay statements, as 
opposed to related statements that must in fairness be considered 
with the misleading portion sought to be introduced by a party. 
The doctrine of completeness does not overcome the hearsay rule. 
The complete statement, in context, must be admissible. Here, the 
prosecution offered Mr. Leleae's statement as a statement against 
interest. The rule of completeness requires that the statement not 
be taken out of context. Once placed in proper context, the court 
must then assess whether the statement, in proper context, is 
admissible. 
A review of the cases cited by the State demonstrates the 
proper operation of the doctrine. The State mis-cites United 
States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1395 (8th Cir. 1987) for the 
proposition that "neither rule 106 nor rule 611 authorizes a court 
to admit unexcepted hearsay." (State's Br. at 32 n. 12) (emphasis 
added). This is not what Woolbright says. Woolbright held "that 
neither Rule 106 . . . nor Rule 611 . . . empowers a court to admit 
unrelated hearsay. . . . " Woolbright, 831 F.2d at 1395 (emphasis 
added). 
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In Woolbright, the district court had, correctly, 
admitted a statement of an unavailable witness as a statement 
against penal interest, admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (3). 
Woolbright, 831 F.2d at 1395. The defendant first offered into 
evidence a statement made to police by one Randle claiming 
ownership of a particular piece of luggage. The court also 
admitted a second statement, holding that the doctrine of 
completeness required its admission. The second statement, which 
was offered by the prosecution, had also been made by Randle, but 
was only to the effect that Randle and the defendant were on a 
honeymoon trip together. The statement was made at a different 
time, and was unrelated to the question of ownership of the 
luggage. 
The court of appeals held that admission of the second 
statement could not be justified based on the doctrine of 
completeness because the two statements were made at different 
times and were unrelated in subject matter. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 
at 1395. 
In the present case, the defendant sought to introduce 
statements that came from the same conversation, which immediately 
preceded and followed the statement introduced by the prosecution, 
and which helped to explain that statement. These statements are 
clearly related to, and provide a proper context for understanding 
the meaning of the statement introduced by the prosecution. 
Woolbright does not support the State's position. 
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In United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692 (4th Cir. 
1996) the court likewise refused to admit unrelated statements 
under the rule of completeness: 
In this case, during direct examination Agent 
Parker testified that the agents found a black 
case containing some of the bait money while 
searching Wilkerson's car. No other 
testimony about any portions of a conversation 
between the agents and Wilkerson regarding 
that particular cache of money was introduced. 
Thus, the rule of completeness . . . would not 
have applied here where there was no partially 
introduced conversation that needed 
clarification or explanation. 
Wilkerson, 84 F.3d at 696 (emphasis added). 
In United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 
1996) , the defendant had properly impeached a witness' trial 
testimony by eliciting from a second witness testimony concerning 
a prior inconsistent statement that had been made by the first 
witness: 
By introducing a portion of the conversation between [the 
first and second witnesses], Collicott 'opened the door' 
to other statements from that conversation which clarify 
or provide context to [the first witness'] prior 
inconsistent statements. However, the other statements 
from [the conversation between the two witnesses] do not 
clarify or provide context to her inconsistent statement 
introduced by Collicott. 
Collicott, 92 F.3d at 982. The purpose of the doctrine of 
completeness would not have been served by the admission of the 
subsequent statements "because there was no concern in this case 
that Collicott introduced a misleadingly-tailored snippet from [the 
conversation]." Id. at 983. In other words, the doctrine of 
completeness was inapplicable because the offered evidence would 
not have served to clarify the prior statement. 
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The State quotes Phoenix Associates III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 
95, 103 (2nd Cir. 1995) out of context. When read in its entirety 
in proper context, the language quoted by the State from Phoenix 
has a different meaning than the State's brief would lead one to 
believe: 
Rule 106 does not compel admission of otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay evidence, and documents generally 
are admitted under the Rule for the same purpose as the 
primary documents they explain. 
Phoenix, 60 F.3d at 103 (citations and quotations omitted). 
The facts of the case help put this statement in proper 
context. The district court had allowed the defendant to introduce 
into evidence the plaintiff's financial statements for the year of 
1989. Plaintiff then argued that the doctrine of completeness 
required the court to also admit the work papers relied on in 
preparing those documents. The appellate court explained why and 
how the work paper was necessary to understand the true meaning of 
the financial statement. As such, the work paper was admissible 
under the doctrine of completeness. Phoenix, 60 F.3d at 102. 
In United States v. Burreson, 643 F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th 
Cir. 1981) , the prosecution had offered into evidence a portion of 
a transcript of testimony previously given by the defendant. 
Burreson, 643 F.2d at 1349. The defendant argued that the doctrine 
of completeness required the admission of the remainder thereof. 
The appellate court stated: 
The record shows that the trial court carefully 
considered the entire transcript [of the prior 
testimony], and added material to the excerpt offered by 
the government to put it in proper context. The court 
concluded that the portion appellants wished to submit 
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was irrelevant and was inadmissible hearsay. This 
decision was not an abuse of the District Court's 
discretion, and appellants' argument is therefore without 
merit. 
Burreson, 643 F.2d at 1349 (emphasis added) . Those portions of the 
transcript which were necessary to explain and put the excerpt in 
its proper context were admitted. The doctrine of completeness had 
been applied. 
A more accurate formulation of the rule exemplified by 
the cases cited by the State would be that when the doctrine of 
completeness is inapplicable to the evidence in question, the 
doctrine will not operate to make otherwise inadmissible evidence 
admissible. However, when the evidence is necessary to explain and 
place in context a statement already in evidence, it should be 
admitted. 
As set forth in his opening brief, the limited portion of 
Mr. Leleae's statement introduced by the State was misleading, 
leading the jury to draw the inference that because Mr. Leleae did 
not "want to be a punk and just stand there and not doing nothing, " 
he must have participated in the assault. To the contrary, in 
context Mr. Leleae was saying that he was trying to break up the 
assault. The trial court should have placed the statement in 
proper context. 
In an effort to establish harmless error, the State 
concludes its argument on this issue with the observation that "the 
entire statement given to Detective Nudd by the defendant would be 
more harmful to defendant than the portions that were admitted." 
(State's Br. at 35.) This observation is pointless. Mr. Leleae 
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never asked to have the entire statement placed in evidence. The 
doctrine of completeness requires admission of only so much as is 
necessary to provide proper context. The rule of completeness "is 
subject to the qualification that only the other parts of the 
document which are relevant and throw light upon the parts already 
admitted become competent upon its introduction. There is no rule 
that either the whole document, or no part of it, is competent. 
(Citations omitted.)" United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 
(6th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Littwin, 338 F.2d 141 
(6th Cir. 1964) ) . Only those portions of a statement which are 
"relevant to an issue in the case" and necessary "to clarify or 
explain the portion already received" need to be admitted. Haddad, 
10 F.3d at 1259. Mr. Leleae's statement should have been put in 
context. This Court should reverse. 
POINT IV. REHEARING IN LOPES HAS BEEN DENIED, AND 
MR. LELEAE'S GANG ENHANCEMENT MUST BE VACATED. 
(Replying to State's brief at Points IV and V, pp. 
35-41) 
The Supreme Court has denied rehearing in State v. Lopes, 
365 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah 1999) . Lopes is good law. Mr. 
Leleae's gang enhancement must be vacated, as the issue was not 
submitted to the jury as Lopes requires. This Court must reverse, 
and vacate the gang enhancement that was imposed. 
The State argues that any error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Not so. Failure to submit material elements of 
an offense to the jury is structural error: 
The provision of our State Constitution which grants 
accused persons the right to a trial by jury extends to 
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each and all of the facts which must be found to be 
present to constitute the crime charged, and such right 
may not be invaded by the presiding judge indicating to 
the jury that any of such facts are established by the 
evidence. The constitutional provision may not be 
disregarded under the pretext that there is no conflict 
in the evidence or that the evidence will permit of but 
one finding. When an accused enters a plea of not 
guilty, he has a right to have his entire case submitted 
to the jury unless he waives such right by expressly 
admitting at the trial the existence of some fact or 
facts which is or are put in issue by the plea of not 
guilty. These principles of law are so fundamental in 
our system of criminal procedure that we deem it 
unnecessary to cite cases and authorities in support 
thereof. 
State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1931). 
"Failure to give an elements instruction for a crime 
satisfies the manifest injustice standard under [Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure] 19(c)] and constitutes 
reversible error as a matter of law." Id. "Further, 
because ' "[t]he general rule is that an accurate 
instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is 
essential," ' failure to provide such an instruction is 
reversible error that can never be considered harmless." 
State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah App. 1998) . Here, the 
jury was not given a proper elements instruction requiring it to 
find the criminal culpability of three actors. This error can 
never be harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, Mr. Leleae respectfully requests 
that his conviction be reversed. Specifically, he requests that 
his gang enhanced sentence be vacated; that this court find the 
evidence insufficient to establish second degree felony aggravated 
assault and order an acquittal on that charge; and that this court 
order that he receive a new trial to determine if he is not guilty, 
20 
guilty of class A misdemeanor assault, or guilty of third degree 
felony aggravated assault. j 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of las; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled 
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a 
preliminary examination, the function of that examination 
is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this 
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable 
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment --
Grand j ury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted 
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of 
the State, or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand 
jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature. 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1998) provides: 
§ 76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms 
apply to this title: 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, 
illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily 
injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a 
substantial risk of death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily 
injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that 
creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary 
disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998) provides: 
§ 76-5-102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force 
or violence, that causes or creates a substantial 
risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the 
person causes substantial bodily injury to another. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that 
the accused caused serious bodily injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1998) provides: 
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to 
a violation of Subsection (1)(a), uses a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (1) (a) is a 
second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1) (b) is a third 
degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) provides: 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct 
commission of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) provides: 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
-- Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed 
in Subsection (4) in concert with two or more 
persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for 
the offense as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as 
used in this section means the defendant and 
two or more other persons would be criminally 
liable for the offense as parties under Section 
76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment is returned, shall cause to be 
subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor 
cases or the information or indictment in 
felony cases notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided 
under this section. The notice shall be in a 
clause separate from and in addition to the 
substantive offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included 
initially, the court may subsequently allow the 
prosecutor to amend the charging document to 
include the subscription if the court finds the 
charging documents, including any statement of 
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant 
of the allegation he committed the offense in 
concert with two or more persons, or if the 
court finds the defendant has not otherwise 
been substantially prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed 
under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, 
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term 
of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other 
secure correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, 
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term 
of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other 
secure correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an 
enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an 
enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an 
enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for 
which a life sentence is imposed, the convicted 
person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 
20 years in prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, 
Chapter 37, 3 7a, 3 7b, or 3 7c, regarding 
drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined 
in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related 
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 
6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6-503, 76-6-504, 
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 
76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 
76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 
76-6-520; 
(2) any offense of obstructing government 
operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8, 
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 
76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other 
violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal 
proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and 
performances offenses under Title 76, Chapter 
10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under 
Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in 
Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Part 19, Money Laundering and Currency 
Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as 
defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any 
separate offense but provides an enhanced 
penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced 
penalties under this section that the persons 
with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in 
concert are not identified, apprehended, 
charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a 
different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury 
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced 
penalty under this section. The imposition of 
the penalty is contingent upon a finding by the 
sentencing judge that this section is 
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the 
court shall enter written findings of fact 
concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or 
execution of the sentence required under this section 
if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would 
be best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances 
justifying the disposition on the record and in 
writing. 
Rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded 
statements. 
When a writing or recorded statement or part 
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may 
require the introduction at that time of any other part 
or any other writing or recorded statement which ought 
in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. 
Rule 611(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Rule 611. Mode and order of interrogation and presentation. 
(a) Control by Court. The court shall exercise 
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating 
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the 
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of 
the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) 
protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination 
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination 
and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court 
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into 
additional matters as if on direct examination. 
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be 
used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be 
necessary to develop the witness' testimony. Ordinarily leading 
questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party 
calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness 
identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading 
questions. 
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the 
number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus 
such an additional number as will allow for all 
peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge 
for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to 
fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, 
and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. 
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate 
thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time 
in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all 
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many 
of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, 
in the order in which they appear on the list, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the 
jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the 
defendant to conduct the examination of the prospective 
jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the 
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the 
defendant to supplement the examination by such further 
inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the 
prospective jurors additional questions requested by 
counsel or the defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or 
to an individual juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called 
to serve at a particular court or for the trial of 
a particular action. A challenge to the panel is 
an objection made to all jurors summoned and may 
be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be 
founded only on a material departure from the 
procedure prescribed with respect to the 
selection, drawing, summoning and return of 
the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel 
shall be taken before the jury is sworn and 
shall be in writing or recorded by the 
reporter. It shall specifically set forth 
the facts constituting the grounds of the 
challenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel 
is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing 
may be had to try any question of fact upon 
which the challenge is based. The jurors 
challenged, and any other persons, may be 
called as witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide the 
challenge. If the challenge to the panel is 
allowed, the court shall discharge the jury 
so far as the trial in question is concerned. 
If a challenge is denied, the court shall 
direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror 
may be either peremptory or for cause. A 
challenge to an individual juror may be made only 
before the jury is sworn to try the action, except 
the court may, for good cause, permit it to be 
made after the juror is sworn but before any of 
the evidence is presented. In challenges for 
cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel 
and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges 
for cause shall be taken first by the prosecution 
and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to 
a juror for which no reason need be given. In capital 
cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is 
entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor 
cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory 
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the 
court may allow the defendants additional peremptory 
challenges and permit them to be exercised separately 
or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection 
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or more 
of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications 
prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity 
which renders one incapable of performing the 
duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the 
fourth degree to the person alleged to be injured 
by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship between 
the prospective juror and any party, witness or 
person alleged to have been victimized or injured 
by the defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds 
that the prospective juror would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict which would be free 
of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be 
disqualified solely because he is indebted to or 
employed by the state or a political subdivision 
thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party 
adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or 
having complained against or having been accused 
by him in a criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury 
which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which 
has tried another person for the particular 
offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally 
sworn to try the same charge, and whose verdict 
was set aside, or which was discharged without a 
verdict after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil 
action brought against the defendant for the act 
charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable 
with death, the entertaining of such conscientious 
opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the 
juror from voting to impose the death penalty following 
conviction regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year 
preceding, has been engaged or interested in 
carrying on any business, calling or employment, 
the carrying on of which is a violation of law, 
where defendant is charged with a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, 
either for or against the defendant on the 
preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an 
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the 
defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense 
charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the cause, or 
to either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of the party challenging; but 
no person shall be disqualified as a juror by 
reason of having formed or expressed an opinion 
upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such 
jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act 
impartially and fairly upon the matter to be 
submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken 
first by the prosecution and then by the defense 
alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed 
before peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate 
jurors be impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order 
in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, 
or become, unable or disqualified to perform their 
duties. The prosecution and defense shall each have 
one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate 
juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same 
qualifications, take the same oath and enjoy the same 
privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a 
juror is a privilege of the person exempted and is not 
a ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall 
be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they 
and each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict 
according to the evidence and the instructions of the 
court. 
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NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished 
opinions remains unfavored, unpublished opinions 
may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value 
on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the 
citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies 
are furnished to the Court and all parties. See 
General Order of November 29, 1993, suspending 
10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or 
further order. 
(The decision of the Court is referenced in a "Table 
of Decisions Without Reported Opinions" appearing 
in the Federal Reporter.) 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Cipriano ZAMUDIO, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 96-2182. 
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. 
April 6, 1998. 
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS 
and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT (FN*) 
Cipriano Zamudio, Alfredo Pando, and Eleno 
Osorio-Soto were tried jointly and convicted of 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more 
than five kilograms of cocaine. Zamudio appeals 
his conviction claiming that (1) a codefendant's 
counsel improperly commented on his right to 
remain silent; (2) the limitations placed on 
Zamudio's cross-examination of Agent Mendonca 
violated his right of confrontation; and (3) the trial 
court improperly admitted hearsay statements by 
Pando through the testimony of former codefendant 
Jose Megallon in violation of his confrontation 
rights. This court affirms. 
Background 
In November 1994, authorities found over five 
kilograms of cocaine in a hidden compartment of a 
trailer. Subsequent investigation revealed that Jose 
Megallon had leased the trailer. In January 1995, 
Megallon voluntarily went to a Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) office after being contacted 
by police. He provided federal agents with a 
statement and agreed to cooperate by allowing the 
agents to tape conversations between him and other 
alleged conspirators. 
Zamudio, Pando, Osorio-Soto, Megallon, and 
other alleged coconspirators were indicted for 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more 
than five kilograms of cocaine. Megallon pleaded 
guilty to conspiracy and agreed to testify for the 
government. Zamudio, Pando, and Osorio-Soto 
were tried jointly and all three were convicted of 
conspiracy in January 1996. Zamudio's appeal 
centers on the testimony presented by two 
government witnesses at the trial: Tony Mendonca, 
a DEA agent, and Megallon. 
At trial, Agent Mendonca testified that he, along 
with Agent Chris Hoover, arrested Zamudio and 
took Zamudio to a DEA office where he was 
questioned. Referring to a report, Mendonca 
testified that Zamudio, after being read his Miranda 
rights, admitted entering into an agreement with 
Megallon to use a trailer for the transportation of 
cocaine. Mendonca also testified that Zamudio 
admitted going with Megallon to lease a trailer 
suitable for the construction of a secret compartment 
and admitted, when a satisfactory trailer was not 
found, agreeing to use a trailer Megallon already 
possessed. 
On cross-examination, counsel for Osorio-Soto 
asked Mendonca whether the statement he attributed 
to Zamudio was made after Zamudio's arrest. 
When Mendonca answered in the affirmative, 
Osorio-Soto's counsel made a motion for severance 
or to strike the statement, arguing: 
I don't have any guarantee that Mr. Zamudio is 
going to be taking the stand, so I would ask the 
Court to strike any statement in regards to what 
Mr. Mendonca said that Mr. Zamudio said in 
regards to my client, Mr. Osorio-Soto. As an 
alternative, I will go ahead and ask for a severance 
in the case if Mr. Zamudio does not take the stand. 
Further explaining his objection, Osorio-Soto's 
counsel stated: 
Your Honor, based on the testimony of Mr. 
Mendonca, he states that he questioned Mr. 
Zamudio and that Mr. Zamudio showed that there 
was in fact a conspiracy involving the trailer. 
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That's the reason for asking for a severance, Your 
Honor. The trailer is going to be used to implicate 
my client, Mr. Osorio-Soto. I don't have any way 
to cross-examination [sic] Mr. Zamudio regarding 
the accuracy or inaccuracy of the statement 
allegedly made by him. 
The court denied Osorio-Soto's motion. 
Counsel for Zamudio then cross-examined 
Mendonca. In her cross-examination of Mendonca, 
she attempted to use Agent Hoover's report, 
Government Exhibit 20, which set out completely 
Zamudio's post-arrest statements, including 
statements describing Pando's and Osorio-Soto's 
involvement in the conspiracy. Both Osorio-Soto 
and Pando objected to use of the report on hearsay 
grounds. When the trial court inquired into the 
government's position, the prosecutor stated his 
belief that certain portions of the report needed to be 
redacted. The trial court reserved ruling on whether 
the document could be received in whole or in part. 
The government then advised the trial court that it 
had a redacted copy of the exhibit. Neither Osorio-
Soto nor Pando objected to the use of the redacted 
report. The government, therefore, withdrew 
Government Exhibit 20 and Zamudio's counsel 
continued cross-examining Mendonca using the 
redacted report, Defendant's Exhibit 2-A. Because 
the report was prepared by Agent Hoover, rather 
than Mendonca, the redacted report was 
provisionally received by the court, subject to 
publication only upon testimony by Hoover verifying 
the document. 
*1186_ Later during the cross-examination of 
Mendonca, Zamudio's counsel asked if Zamudio 
had provided information to the agents about "the 
agreement between Osorio and Pando to smuggle 
cocaine." Osorio-Soto' s counsel immediately 
objected to the question and moved for severance. 
The court denied severance and overruled the 
objection. Mendonca answered the question in the 
negative and Zamudio's counsel continued the cross-
examination. The government then objected on the 
grounds that allowing Zamudio's counsel to elicit 
testimony regarding what Zamudio said about the 
other codefendants would create a Bruton problem. 
SeeBruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 
1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). The court sustained 
the government's objection and limited Zamudio's 
cross-examination to the line of inquiry that was 
addressed in direct examination. 
The other government witness whose testimony is 
relevant to this appeal is Megallon. Megallon, a 
coconspirator turned government informant, testified 
about his involvement in the conspiracy and 
interactions with the defendants. Additionally, 
through Megallon's testimony, the government 
introduced and played three conversations which 
were taped while Megallon was cooperating with the 
DEA: a January 26, 1995 conversation between 
Megallon and Zamudio; a February 14, 1995 
telephone conversation between Megallon and 
Pando; and a February 22, 1995 conversation 
between Megallon and Zamudio. The jury was also 
provided with English and Spanish transcripts of 
these taped conversations, which were primarily in 
Spanish. While Zamudio does not challenge the 
admissibility of the taped conversations between 
Megallon and himself, he contends the trial court 
erred in admitting the telephone conversation 
between Pando and Megallon. Pando, who fled 
after the first day of trial, did not testify, but the 
trial of the charges against him proceeded in 
absentia. 
Comment on Zamudio's Failure to Testify 
On appeal, Zamudio argues that Osorio-Soto's 
counsel impermissibly commented on Zamudio's 
failure to testify in violation of his Fifth Amendment 
rights. Specifically, in commenting on his motion 
for severance or to strike statements attributed to 
Zamudio by Agent Mendonca, Osorio-Soto's 
counsel, in the presence of the jury, stated: "I don't 
have any guarantee that Mr. Zamudio is going to be 
taking the stand"; "I will go ahead and ask for a 
severance in the case if Mr. Zamudio does not take 
the stand"; and "I don't have any way to cross-
examin[e] Mr. Zamudio regarding the accuracy or 
inaccuracy of the statement allegedly made by him." 
(FN1) 
Zamudio did not object to these statements during 
trial. Therefore, our review is limited to plain 
error. See United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d 
819, 827 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, --- U.S. — , 118 
S.Ct. 129, 139 L.Ed.2d 78 (1997). This court may 
correct an error not raised at trial only if we find 
there is "(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that 
affect[s] substantial rights. If all three conditions 
are met, [this] court may then exercise its discretion 
to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error 
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public 
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reputation of judicial proceedings." Johnson v. 
United States, 520 U.S. 461, ---, 117 S.Ct. 
1544, 1548-49, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (alterations 
in original) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 
For purposes of this appeal, we assume, without 
deciding, that the statements Zamudio challenges 
created error and the error is plain. Before this 
court may correct such an error, however, the 
defendant has the burden of showing that the error 
affected substantial rights, which generally means 
the defendant must show he was prejudiced by the 
error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); see 
also Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d at 827-28. 
Furthermore, even if defendant meets his burden of 
showing the error affected substantial rights, this 
court may not order correction unless it also finds 
the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings. See 
Johnson, 520 U.S. at — , 117 S.Ct. at 1550. In 
this case, Zamudio has failed to show he was 
prejudiced by the alleged error. Furthermore, even 
if Zamudio had shown prejudice, there exists no 
basis in the record for concluding that the error 
seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings. 
*1186_ Zamudio argues the statements were 
prejudicial because (1) they were direct comments 
on his failure to testify; (2) the nature of the 
government's case was such that only his own 
testimony could have fully contradicted the 
government's evidence; and (3) the government's 
case relied heavily on the testimony of Megallon, a 
convicted informant, and the challenged testimony 
of Agent Mendonca regarding Zamudio's admission. 
A number of other factors, however, mitigate any 
prejudicial effect the statements could have had on 
the jurors' deliberations. 
First, the statements, while made in the presence 
of the jury, were not directed at the jurors. This 
case is therefore distinguishable from cases 
involving comments made to jurors during closing 
arguments. 
Second, the comments did not suggest the jurors 
should infer Zamudio's guilt from his failure to 
testify. Cf United States v. Wing, 104 F.3d 986, 
990-91 (7th Cir.1997) (holding court's remarks, 
while directly commenting on defendant's failure to 
testify, did not constitute plain error because they 
did not invite jurors to infer guilt from defendant's 
failure to testify and there was substantial evidence 
of defendant's guilt); United States v. Sarno, 73 
F.3d 1470, 1498 (9th Cir.1995) (holding single 
improper comment by prosecutor regarding 
defendant's failure to testify did not mandate 
reversal when comment did not invite jury to infer 
guilt from silence and judge gave jurors curative 
instruction); United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522, 
1534 (11th Cir.1989) ("When the 'comment' [on the 
failure of the accused to testify] comes from an actor 
(such as counsel for a codefendant) without an 
institutional interest in the defendant's guilt, .... the 
court should ask whether the comment actually or 
implicitly invited the jury to infer guilt from 
silence."). Rather, the comments focused only on 
the ability of Osorio-Soto to cross-examine Zamudio 
regarding statements Zamudio made to agents after 
his arrest. 
Third, the jurors were properly instructed that they 
may not infer guilt from a defendant's failure to 
testify. Specifically, upon conclusion of the closing 
arguments, the judge instructed the jury that "a 
Defendant is presumed by law to be innocent. The 
law does not require a Defendant to prove his 
innocence or produce any evidence at all, and no 
inference whatsoever may be drawn from the 
election of a Defendant not to testify." (Emphasis 
added.) Jurors are presumed to follow the 
instructions given to them. See United States v. 
Coleman, 1 F.3d 1500, 1506 (10th Cir.1993). 
Finally, contrary to Zamudio's assertions, there 
was substantial evidence of his guilt. Not only did 
Mendonca testify as to Zamudio's post-arrest 
admission and Megallon testify as to Zamudio's 
involvement in the conspiracy, but the government 
also introduced two taped conversations in which 
Megallon and Zamudio discussed the conspiracy and 
what was to be done about the trailer which 
government agents seized. 
Given the numerous factors mitigating any effect 
of the statements regarding Zamudio's failure to 
testify, Zamudio failed to meet his burden of 
showing he was prejudiced by the alleged error. 
Moreover, the alleged error did not seriously affect 
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings. This court therefore holds that the 
statements by Osorio-Soto's counsel do not 
constitute reversible error. 
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Restriction on Defendant's Cross-Examination of 
Mendonca 
Zamudio contends the district court impermissibly 
restricted his cross-examination of Agent Mendonca 
by prohibiting inquiry into portions of Zamudio's 
post-arrest statement. On direct examination, Agent 
Mendonca testified that, among other things, 
Zamudio admitted agreeing to use a trailer for the 
transportation of cocaine and admitted going with 
Megallon to rent a suitable trailer. During the 
cross-examination of Agent Mendonca, Zamudio's 
counsel tried to elicit testimony regarding other 
statements Zamudio made at the time of his arrest. 
Because these additional statements apparently 
would implicate codefendants Pando and Osorio-
Soto, creating a Bruton problem, the district court 
limited Zamudio's counsel to the line of inquiry 
addressed in direct examination and allowed only a 
redacted version of defendant's post-arrest statement 
to be used. Zamudio maintains that this limitation 
on his cross-examination of Agent Mendonca 
violated his confrontation rights. He argues that 
because Agent Mendonca testified about portions of 
his post-arrest statement on direct examination, the 
district court was required to allow him to cross-
examine Agent Mendonca concerning other portions 
of the post-arrest statement which were necessary to 
place the admitted evidence into context. 
*1186_ "We review de novo whether a defendant's 
confrontation rights were violated by reason of 
improper cross-examination restrictions...." United 
States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1529 (10th 
Cir.1994). While the Confrontation Clause 
guarantees defendants an "opportunity for effective 
cross-examination," it does not guarantee a "cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to 
whatever extent, the defense might wish." 
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 
292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985); accord Pedraza, 27 
F.3d at 1529. 
While the government was entitled to introduce 
Zamudio's admissions under Fed.R.Evid. 
801(d)(2)(A), Zamudio was not similarly entitled to 
offer his own exculpatory statements through the 
testimony of Agent Mendonca because such 
statements, if offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted, would constitute hearsay. See 
Fed.R.Evid. 801, 802. Zamudio, however, 
maintains that because certain portions of his post-
arrest statements were admitted on direct 
examination, the district court was required to admit 
other portions of his statement to place the admitted 
evidence into context. 
Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
provides that "[w]hen a writing or recorded 
statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an 
adverse party may require the introduction at that 
time of any other part or any other writing or 
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be 
considered contemporaneously with it." While 
Rule 106 explicitly applies only to writings and 
recorded statements, the rule of completeness 
embodied in Rule 106 is " 'substantially applicable 
to oral testimony, as well1 by virtue of Fed.R.Evid. 
611(a), which obligates the court to 'make the 
interrogation and presentation effective for the 
ascertainment of the truth.' " United States v. 
Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting 
United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 650 n. 5 
(2d Cir.1989)); see also United States v. Li, 55 
F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. 
Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258-59 (7th Cir.1993); 1 
Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 
Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 106.02[3] & nn. 
12-13 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.1997). 
Accordingly, a redacted version of a defendant's 
post-arrest statement is impermissible if it "unfairly 
distort[s] the original" or "exclude[s] substantially 
exculpatory information." Mussaleen, 35 F.3d at 
696; see also United States v. Washington, 952 
F.2d 1402, 1404 (D.C.Cir.1991); United States v. 
Kaminski, 692 F.2d 505, 522 (8th Cir.1982). 
The rule of completeness, however, does not 
necessarily require admission of a defendant's entire 
statement. Rather, only those portions which are 
"relevant to an issue in the case" and necessary "to 
clarify or explain the portion already received" need 
to be admitted. Haddad, 10 F.3d at 1259; see also 
Li, 55 F.3d at 329-30; cf. United States v. Branch, 
91 F.3d 699, 728 (5th Cir.1996) (discussing Rule 
106 and noting that "[although different circuits 
have elaborated Rule 106's 'fairness' standard in 
different ways, common to all is the requirement 
that the omitted portion be relevant and necessary to 
qualify, explain, or place into context the portion 
already introduced" (internal citations and quotations 
omitted)), cert, denied, — U.S. —-, —-, 117 S.Ct. 
1466, 1467, 137 L.Ed.2d 681 (1997). In 
determining whether a disputed portion of a 
statement must be admitted, the trial court should 
consider whether "(1) it explains the admitted 
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evidence, (2) places the admitted evidence in 
context, (3) avoids misleading the jury, and (4) 
insures fair and impartial understanding of the 
evidence." Li, 55 F.3d at 330; see also Haddad, 
10 F.3d at 1259. 
*1186_ Zamudio's claim that his confrontation 
rights were violated, therefore, turns on whether the 
excluded portions of his post-arrest statement were 
necessary to explain or place into context the 
evidence admitted during direct examination. If the 
rule of completeness was not violated by the 
exclusion of this evidence, the limitation placed on 
Zamudio's cross-examination was proper because 
the excluded portions were not otherwise admissible. 
Cf. United States v. Thuna, 786 F.2d 437, 442 n. 10 
(1st Cir.1986) (noting that because redaction of 
report of defendant's post-arrest statements was not 
prejudicial to defendant, the district court was within 
its discretion to limit cross-examination regarding 
the report). 
Zamudio did not designate the written report of his 
post-arrest statements as part of the record on appeal 
nor did he make a proffer as to what the omitted 
portions of his statement would have shown. This 
court is therefore unable to evaluate the precise 
content of the omitted portions of Zamudio's 
statement. 
In his opening brief Zamudio simply states that the 
district court improperly limited inquiry into those 
portions of his post-arrest statement "wherein he 
attempted to shift the blame from himself to co-
defendants Osorio and Pando." Specifically, 
Zamudio complains that his counsel was unable to 
inquire into "the context of [his] admissions, the 
purpose of Pando and Osorio in renting the trailer, 
and other aspects of an alleged agreement between 
Osorio and Pando of which Zamudio was not part." 
In his reply brief he asserts that the omitted portions 
"attempted to place into context his activities in the 
alleged conspiracy and contrast them with the 
purposeful involvement of the co-defendants Osorio 
and Pando." It appears, therefore, that the 
excluded portions of Zamudio's statement detail 
Osorio-Soto's and Pando's involvement in the 
conspiracy and attempt to shift the blame from 
Zamudio to his coconspirators based primarily on 
their more meaningful involvement in the scheme. 
Zamudio has not argued that the excluded portions 
of the statement show he did not participate in the 
conspiracy in the manner Agent Mendonca testified 
to on direct examination nor does he argue that the 
portions show his actions were done only under 
duress. The excluded portions therefore do not 
appear to be exculpatory. 
This court cannot conclude the omitted portions of 
Zamudio's post-arrest statements were necessary to 
explain the admitted evidence or place that evidence 
into context. If, as it appears, the omitted portions 
of Zamudio's post-arrest statement did no more than 
show Osorio-Soto's and Pando's involvement in the 
scheme, the rule of completeness did not require 
their admission because Osorio-Soto's and Pando's 
involvement is not necessary to explain or place into 
context Zamudio's act of agreeing to participate in 
the conspiracy or his act of accompanying Megallon 
to rent a trailer. Cf. Li, 55 F.3d at 330 (holding 
statement that defendant was threatened by 
codefendant was not necessary to explain or 
understand defendant's admission to making 
payment to codefendant absent a coercion defense). 
Because the record on appeal is insufficient to 
support Zamudio's assertion that his confrontation 
rights were violated and because Zamudio's 
appellate presentation does not suggest any 
legitimate basis for admission of the redacted 
portions of his statement, exclusion of the testimony 
was not error. 
Admission of Taped Conversation 
Zamudio's final argument is that the tape and 
transcript of the February 14, 1995 telephone 
conversation between Megallon and Pando 
constituted inadmissible hearsay and that the district 
court's erroneous admission of that taped 
conversation and transcript into evidence violated his 
confrontation rights because Pando did not testify at 
the trial. The government maintains the taped 
statements were properly admitted as coconspirator 
statements under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), which 
provides that "[a] statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he 
statement is offered against a party and is ... a 
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the 
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 
In the unpublished opinion, United States v. 
Osorio-Soto, No. 96-2184, 1998 WL 58106 (10th 
Cir. Feb. 12, 1998), this court considered whether 
the same taped conversation was properly admitted 
against Zamudio's codefendant Osorio-Soto. (FN2) 
In Osorio-Soto, this court held that the taped 
conversation between Megallon and Pando did not 
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occur "during the course" of the conspiracy and was 
therefore inadmissible against Osorio-Soto. See id. 
at *2. Having previously concluded that the taped 
conversation did not occur during the course of the 
conspiracy, this court now holds that the tape and 
transcript were inadmissible against Zamudio. This 
court, however, may uphold Zamudio's conviction if 
admission of the taped conversation and transcript 
constituted harmless error. 
*1186_ Because Zamudio argues admission of the 
taped conversation violated his confrontation rights, 
we apply the constitutional harmless error standard. 
See United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1497 (10th 
Cir.1993). Accordingly, this court will uphold 
Zamudio's conviction only if it concludes the error 
was " 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id. 
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 
87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). Upon 
reviewing the record, this court concludes admission 
of the taped conversation between Pando and 
Megallon was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
because the evidence it contained implicating 
Zamudio was extremely weak, while other evidence 
of his guilt was overwhelming. Cf. Delaware v. 
VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (listing "importance of the 
witnesses] testimony in the prosecution's case" and 
"the overall strength of the prosecution's case" 
among factors courts should consider in determining 
whether violation of Confrontation Clause 
constitutes harmless error); Harrington v. 
California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 
23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969) (holding violation of 
confrontation rights under Bruton was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt because case against 
defendant was overwhelming). 
The taped conversation between Megallon and 
Pando did not mention Zamudio by name. The only 
apparent reference to Zamudio during the 
conversation was made by Pando in response to 
Megallon's statements about the police. Megallon 
stated that the police had contacted him and he did 
not know what to tell the police because they already 
had the trailer. In reply Pando stated, "What do you 
want me tell you" and repeatedly instructed 
Megallon to ask "that guy" about the situation. 
During direct examination, Megallon testified that 
when Pando told him to talk to "that guy," he 
understood Zamudio was the person referenced. 
There is nothing else in the taped conversation 
implicating Zamudio. 
In contrast to the limited evidence of guilt found in 
the taped conversation between Megallon and 
Pando, other evidence of Zamudio's guilt was 
overwhelming. Agent Mendonca testified that 
Zamudio admitted entering into an agreement with 
Megallon to transport cocaine and admitted going 
with Megallon to rent a suitable trailer. Megallon 
also testified that he met with Zamudio and Pando at 
a tire shop and that during this meeting, the plan to 
transport drugs was discussed. Megallon testified 
that he was asked to participate in the scheme by 
renting a trailer and both Zamudio and Pando 
informed him of how the trailer was to be used. He 
further testified that both Zamudio and Pando 
accompanied him to the rental place and when a 
suitable trailer was not found, Megallon allowed 
Zamudio and Pando to use his leased trailer. 
Additionally, Megallon testified that he subsequently 
observed new rivets three to four feet from the front 
of the trailer he delivered to Zamudio and Pando, 
which is consistent with Danny Martinez's (FN3) 
testimony that the seized trailer had a false 
compartment in the front containing cocaine. 
Finally, the government introduced two taped 
conversations between Zamudio and Megallon, 
discussing the conspiracy and the trailer. Any 
negative inference which could be drawn from the 
challenged tape recorded conversation between 
Pando and Megallon pales in comparison to the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt found elsewhere in 
the record. This court therefore concludes the error 
in admitting the taped conversation was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The judgment of the United States District Court 
for the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 
Judge McWilliams concurs in the result. 
FN* This order and judgment is not binding 
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 
case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The 
court generally disfavors the citation of orders and 
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment 
may be cited under the terms and conditions of 
10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
FN1. At the outset of the trial, the district judge 
instructed the parties that "no bench conferences 
[would] be permitted" and that all speaking 
objections would be considered either "before the 
day's business begins, during recess or at the end 
of the day." While this court appreciates the need 
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for efiicicnc}, the judge's instructions created 
problems for the parties in this case. Had the 
judge permitted limited but necessary bench 
conferences, counsel for Osorio-Soto could have 
explained his objection to the testimony outside the 
hearing of the jury. This issue therefore could 
have been avoided entirely 
*1186_ FN2. Zamudio's codefendanl Osorio-Soto 
argued that all three taped conversations were 
inadmissible against him: the January 26, 1995 
conversation between Megallon and Zamudio, the 
February 14, 1995 telephone conversation between 
Megallon and Pando, and the February 22, 1995 
conversation between Megallon and Zamudio. See 
United States v. Osorio-Soto, No. 96-2184, 1998 
WL 58106, ai H UOth Cir. Feb. 12, 1998). 
Zamudio does not appeal admission of the two 
taped conversation between him and Megallon 
because a party's own statement may be offered 
against the party under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 
Zamudio and Osorio-Soto, however, are in the 
same position as to the taped conversation between 
Megallon and Pando because neither was a party to 
the conversation. Both argue that the taped 
conversation between Megallon and Pando 
constituted inadmissible hearsay. 
FN3. Danny Martinez, who is a sergeant with the 
Motor Transportation Division of the Taxation and 
Revenue Department for the State of New Mexico, 
was involved in the search of the seized trailer. 
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